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Rand Little Changed as Report May Show Output Near Record Low (Bloomberg)

June 1, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

June 1 (Bloomberg) — South Africa’s rand was little changed before a report that will probably show manufacturing output remained near a record low and as technical charts showed the currency was due for a decline.

Overallotment: May 12

May 13, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

  • US AAA credit rating at risk, former GAO director claims (Reuters)
  • GM sinks to fresh low as Chapter 11 looms (FT)
  • Social Security, Medicare will be depleted much earlier than expected (Bloomberg)
  • Airbus orders nosedive, profit tumbles (Daily Telegraph)
  • What foreclosures? After brand spanking new megaloss, Freddie Mac net worth is below $0 (FT)
  • FDIC planning for huge bank failure? (The Pragmatic Capitalist)
  • U.K. unemployment jumps to 13 year high (Daily Telegraph)
  • Taylor says Fed may not have much time before rate rise needed (Bloomberg)
  • US foreclosure program may be insufficient (FT)
  • AIG trustees should answer to taxpayers, not Fed (Bloomberg)
  • IMF urges stress tests on European banks (FT)


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Hedge Fund LP Secondary Market Interest Update

May 11, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Secondary market hedge fund interests continue to be actively traded, and as LP broker Hedge Bay indicates, the discounts for offers have hit unprecedented levels. The most recent level of Hedge Bay’s Secondary Market Index Value hit an all time low of 80.31 for the month of March.

In terms of specific bids and asks, presented below are the most notable blocks for sale over the past 10 days:

Quantek Opportunity Fund: $15.0 million
Diamondback Offshore Fund: $10.0 million
Brevet Capital Special Opps: $10.7 million
New Stream Capital Fund: $8.2 million
Global Secured Capital Fund: $6.5 million
Whitecap Offshore: $5.0 million
Hound Partners: $2.0 million
Contrarian Capital Finance: $1.9 million

On the bidside, there have been quite a few interested buyers as well, the most notable of which are the following brand name hedge funds:

Basso Investors: $10.0 million
GoldenTree Offshore: $10.0 million
Millennium: $8.0 million
Third Eye: $19 million (offset by $12.5 million for sale)
Ore Hill: $5.0 million
Paulson Advantage: $5.0 million
King Street Capital: $5.0 million
Pershing Square: $5.0 million
Jana Partners: $5.0 million
One East Partners: $1.8 million

Ultimately, whether a transaction occurs depends on whether the buyer and seller are willing and able to agree on a final transaction price. It is likely that the bid/ask spreads in this highly illiquid market would be wide enough to prevent all but the most determined sellers and buyers.


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Loans Versus Bonds Relative Value: Week Of May 7

May 11, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Heat seeking in both bonds and loans was the dominant theme, with the usual suspects continuing to rip. Comparing current levels on garbage credits like Neiman Marcus, Sealy and TRW with their spreads 3 months ago and one can only question the sanity of even the credit market. Unlike last week when there were just three Fox Two instances, targeted at Huntsman, Graham Packaging and Neiman Marcus, this past week’s IR-signature tracking selection is broader and even junkier.

“Solid” names like Compucom, Huntsman, Neiman Marcus, Sealy and TRW continued their ripfest tighter in bond land, and in many instances, in loans as well, while Aeroflex loans where the best relative secured performer. The only bonds widening in the entire 30 name universe were those of Michael Foods, and Constellation Brands – obviously consumer staples have every right to be seen as the riskiest last week when the rolling squeeze among garbage credits was doing all it could to flatter the equity markets.


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Will The Real Chryslergate Fallout Please Stand Up

May 10, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Now that the issue of those pesky first lien hold outs has been dealt with once and for all, the Chrysler saga audience can turn their attention to the more relevant question of how the bankruptcy will actually affect not only upstream suppliers’ production and their employment levels, but the overall domestic and global economy. In order for readers to grasp the magnitude of the 2nd and 3rd derivatives of this implosion, I republish the most recent docket notification list, which demonstrates just how many entities have an immediate vested interest in this case.

More relevantly, the question arises of just what all the Chrysler posturing will imply for the process of the inevitable GM bankruptcy, which as of today is a mere 3 weeks away. If the Chrysler case study is any indication, the administration will once again put the blame solidly on any and all investment fiduciaries (i.e. ad hoc bondholder committee) who are unwilling to relinquish absolute priority, which is not surprising. What is paradoxical, as was in the Chrysler case, is that the administration needs bankruptcy in order to cancel and amend existing contracts, full stop. If Rattner can scapegoat someone in the process of filing GM, so much the better – he would thus accomplish his operational mission of fixing a terminally faulty contractual system and take the political pressure off his master with his core UAW constituency. Of course, the derivative of the latter is that one may very well expect a million man march, fully equipped with tar and feathers, on Wall Street from Detroit come June 1st when the bankruptcy is official.

Thereby the politics of the problem, as Homer Simpson would say, are “wrapped in a neat, little package.” And after all, Obama has thus far been a master of the depoliticizing of any economically disastrous issue, and removing any potential blame from D.C. and associated lobby group interests and redirecting to the populist path of least resistance. What would be a curious detour is if the ad hoc creditor committee were to relinquish any claims against their paltry 10% equity in the pro forma company, and thus call Obama’s bluff, who would still need to pursue the bankruptcy court route, however this time with no “straw man” scapegoat available.

But the real question remains, now that we are set on the course of epic bankruptcy fall out, bizarro market moves notwithstanding, what really happens to the U.S. economy?

For an attempted answer, I turn my attention to a series of articles by none other than Moody’s, which in all fairness, has actually been providing some rather admirable primary research as of late. Moody’s focuses on the problem from several angles, the first of which is the question of containment and the fate of GM.

Despite the Obama administration’s assertion that Chrysler’s filing will be “a quick and surgical” reorganization under section 363 of the Bankruptcy code, the process could be more complicated, contentious and protracted than the government anticipates. In addition, it is uncertain whether various government initiatives will be effective, such as those to contain the collateral damage of the Chrysler filing on the rest of the U.S. automotive sector, and the government’s commitment to supporting Chrysler through the bankruptcy process.

It is clear that the Chrysler bankruptcy filing will help define the path that a GM bankruptcy filing might take. However, because of the complex, highly fluid, and largely uncharted nature of many of the legal and operational issues surrounding the bankruptcy of a U.S. auto manufacturer, it is unclear how that path will evolve. It is also unclear whether the bankruptcy filing of Chrysler will materially increase or decrease the likelihood that GM will follow Chrysler down that path. We continue to believe that the probability of a GM bankruptcy is very high, as reflected in the company’s Ca Corporate Family and Probability of Default Ratings.

The ongoing resolution of the Chrysler bankruptcy process will have an important impact on the behavior of GM’s constituents including creditors, the UAW, suppliers, dealers, and the U.S. government, and on their respective willingness to make concessions necessary to avoid a bankruptcy filing. GM has until May 31 to resubmit a viable restructuring plan to the government or it may be forced to file for bankruptcy. To date, the company has not been able to accomplish the three key targets identified by the government as being essential to a viable plan: eliminating two-thirds of its unsecured debt; achieving UAW wage and benefit parity with transplants; and, reaching an agreement with the UAW allowing the company to fund up to half of its future VEBA contributions with company stock.

The legal issues that will be addressed by the court hearing the Chrysler proceedings include: collateral valuation, the potential sale of assets, determinations of adequate protection for secured lenders, the priming of secured lenders’ interest by the government as debtor-in-possession lender, priority of claim of unsecured creditors, and the rejection of burdensome contracts. The court’s determinations in these matters, and the time frame necessary to conclude the proceedings, could well determine the degree to which GM’s various constituents, including the government, view bankruptcy as an effective path for GM.

In addition to the legal issues that the bankruptcy path poses for Chrysler and potentially for GM, this path also poses a number of operational risks. All of the Detroit-3 OEMs have maintained that there are considerable operations risks associated with a bankruptcy filing by any of them. These risks include: 1) a rapid and severe decline in shipments as consumers retreat from the products of a manufacturer that has filed for bankruptcy; 2) a resulting decline in the retail price of vehicles sold by the filing OEM; 3) wide-spread bankruptcies among that OEM’s already stressed supply base; and, 4) increased stress upon other OEMs due to price pressure within the new car market, and the mutual dependence upon suppliers.

The Obama administration and its Automotive Task Force recognize these risks, and have taken a number of relatively aggressive steps to contain the collateral damage and disruption that could potentially result from an OEM’s bankruptcy filing. These initiatives include:

  • Providing government guarantees for new-car warranties of Chrysler and GM vehicles;

  • Providing government guarantees for approximately $5 billion in Chrysler and GM payables due to suppliers.

In addition to these initiatives, which were put in place prior to the Chrysler filing, the government has taken two critical steps intended to support a successful reorganization of Chrysler and limit the disruption within the U.S. automotive sector. These steps are:

  • Providing debtor in possession financing for Chrysler;

  • Arranging for GMAC to provide retail and wholesale financing in support of Chrysler’s operations.

Since December 2008, when GM and Chrysler accepted government bailout loans, consumer anxiety about the ongoing viability of each company has taken a toll on their U.S. shipment levels and contributed to a loss of market share. In contrast, Ford, which has consistently maintained that it does not need government loans, has picked up share. Consumer willingness to purchase Chrysler’s products now that it has filed will be a critical near-term development that will be closely watched for indications of the revenue pressure that GM might face in the event of a filing. We expect that despite government support there would be an initially high degree of consumer reluctance to purchase a vehicle from GM were it to file for bankruptcy. This would exacerbate the pace of cash burn, and increase the level of government loans that would be needed. Nevertheless, we believe that the government will continue to view bankruptcy as an option if GM is unable to formulate an acceptable restructuring plan.

Although suppliers to Chrysler and the other domestic OEMs are vulnerable to an OEM bankruptcy, their greatest risk comes from the production cutbacks that will occur irrespective of whether an OEM restructures in or outside of bankruptcy. Consequently, additional government support for suppliers may be necessary in order to insure the viability of the Detroit-3.

Moody’s then goes on to consider the likelihood of just how surgical this bankruptcy could be.

Section 363 provides the basis for major asset sales, rejection of burdensome contracts and the use of secured creditors’ collateral for a company’s “fresh start” envisioned by the code. But it is also structured to ensure procedural fairness for all creditors with an interest in the bankruptcy estate. Property of the bankruptcy estate under section 363 can only be used over the objections of a party with an interest in that property after the issues have been fully litigated in formal hearings. A 363 proceeding would likely include hearings on collateral valuation, among other things, with expert witnesses from each side.

Section 363 mandates that any party with an interest in property to be used in a reorganization receive “adequate protection” in order not to violate the U.S. constitution’s “takings clause.” A security interest is a property interest. In this respect, the U.S. and Canadian governments’ $4.5 billion DIP loan ironically could further prolong the bankruptcy process. The code allows first lienholders’ interest to be primed or superseded (in exchange for a replacement lien) by debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders provided the “adequate protection” standard is satisfied. “Adequate protection” hearings involve complex issues such as whether secured lenders have a comparable equity cushion in any substituted collateral. In this respect, the holdout lenders also could contest a proposed sale of “good assets” to Fiat under section 363 as not affording them “adequate protection.”

Furthermore, secured creditors contesting a reorganization plan can argue that the value of the collateral in which they have a security interest is well in excess of that proposed that they receive by the plan’s proponents. The bankruptcy code includes a “best interest” test under which each interest holder will receive at least as much under a Chapter 11 plan as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. If the holdout lenders prevail in such an argument, they could seek to convert the proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Alternatively, the reorganization plan would need to be renegotiated so as not to violate the “best interest” test.

All these issues need to be resolved before any vote on a reorganization plan – even if the plan’s proponents have the necessary votes. And given the continuing decline in the fortunes of the auto industry, the plan’s “feasibility” – which they must demonstrate to the court – may become a real issue, particularly if the proceedings become protracted.

Whatever scenario eventually unfolds, the Chrysler bankruptcy is historic and may become either a template or a warning sign for future bankruptcies, such as that of General Motors. At this point, it is difficult to make any predictions other than that the process is likely to take considerably longer than the 30 to 60 days projected by the administration.

Now that the lender hold out issue has been resolved, this might indeed streamline the process somewhat, however in the odd chance that some overbidder to Fiat’s stalking horse bid does emerge out of left field, the process is likely to be detoured into a lengthy, burdensome and expensive process: just what all the various lawyers are currently hoping for.

But back to the law of unintended consequences. It has long been Zero Hedge’s contention that the ultimate impact on the upstream suppliers to the D-3 is where the pain will be most acute. Moody’s agrees.

Chrysler LLC’s bankruptcy will likely lead to further financial and operating disruption within the automotive supplier sector. The ratings of issuers within the sector that are most exposed to Chrysler’s bankruptcy have been adjusted in anticipation of a filing; many have Corporate Family ratings in the Caa category, reflecting an elevated risk that they too may need to seek bankruptcy protection. However, a potential liquidation of Chrysler under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code would have a more severe impact on expected loss assumptions for certain automotive suppliers. In such a scenario, further downward adjustments of ratings could be necessary.

In December 2008, we estimated that there was a 70% likelihood that one or more of the Detroit-3 auto manufactures would file for bankruptcy. Since that time, the Obama administration and its Automotive Task Force have taken steps to help mitigate the potentially disruptive effect that an uncontrolled, free-fall bankruptcy could have for the domestic automotive supplier sector. These steps include providing a guarantee of selected automotive supplier receivables through the Auto Supplier Support Program, and actions to support GM and Chrysler vehicle warranties. Details of these programs are developing.

The administration will likely continue to take steps to contain the disruption that might be caused by Chrysler’s bankruptcy. However, given the high level of interconnection among automotive manufacturers, automotive suppliers, and other constituents, uncertainty remains as to how successful these programs will be in providing support for the auto supplier industry.

…Automotive manufactures are continuing to adjust manufacturing capacity to the lower level of consumer demand, while announcing the elimination of certain underperforming models and brands. The radical changes occurring at the automakers will necessitate restructurings of a similar scope among the parts suppliers, and could give rise to more bankruptcies in the industry.

Additionally, the impact on domestic auto retailers should also not be ignored. This is especially relevant as this is a sector that has seen an impressive short squeeze recently, and current shareholders would be well-advised to consider all potential implications from the slow death of the D-3.

We expect the initial impact on rated auto retailers from the Chrysler’s bankruptcy to not be material. As the rated dealers generate a limited portion of their sales from Chrysler products, we expect this event will be manageable, absent contagion spreading to the industry as a whole. Our primary focus for auto retailers from this event will be on liquidity, and assessing whether or not weaker operating performance will reduce headroom under financial covenants for any of the auto retailers’ committed credit facilities.

The larger auto retailers that we rate, listed below, have been reducing their exposure to the Detroit-3 for some years. The exhibit shows the rated universe and their disclosed contributions to total new unit sales from all Chrysler brands (including Dodge, Jeep and Chrysler).

It is important to note that while new car sales are a large driver of an auto dealer’s revenue, profitability is driven primarily by parts and service (particularly servicing cars that remain under manufacturer warranty) and finance and insurance sales. Used car sales are an important, and less volatile, contributor as well.

We have taken a number of negative rating actions in the auto retailing sector in 2009, primarily as credit metrics weakened as consumers deferred purchases of new and used cars and ancillary services. The deteriorating positions of Chrysler and General Motors, specifically, have not been significant drivers of these recent rating actions.

The framework agreed to by Fiat, Chrysler, the UAW and the U.S. and Canadian governments as part of the Chapter 11 filing contains certain elements that will limit disruption for rated auto dealers:

The U.S. Treasury will make available the Warranty Support Program to Chrysler, which will provide a U.S. Treasury backstop on the orderly payment of warranties for cars sold during the restructuring period. This program should help support values of new cars held and to be acquired by auto dealers and facilitate sales to the end consumers.

Chrysler will enter into an agreement with General Motors Acceptance Corp (GMAC) to provide dealer and customer financing. The U.S. Government will support GMAC in its support of the Chrysler business, including liquidity and capitalization.

Chrysler will seek “first day” hearings to honor customer warranties and dealer incentives for those dealers who are expected to be part of Chrysler’s distribution network going forward. Certain higher risk dealers have been identified by Chrysler and GMAC and will not continue with Chrysler. To date, the names of these dealers have not been made public. However, in view of the overall standing of the rated auto retailers, we would expect few, if any, of their individual Chrysler dealerships to be on the list for anticipated wind down.

We do not rule out some level of modest short-term disruption to rated auto retailers as some dealerships are closed and their inventories liquidated and also due to consumer uncertainty in the initial stages of the bankruptcy. We will monitor developments with Chrysler, noting these developments may also create some precedent in the event there is a similar restructuring or otherwise by General Motors in the near term.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the consideration of the impact on U.S. financial institutions that have numerous and branched interests in both auto producers through direct and indirect exposure.

The bankruptcy of Chrysler and, possibly, of other manufacturers/suppliers will surely affect some banks, although in a limited way. Most directly, the exposures they do have will become impaired. However, the long timeline associated with domestic auto manufacturers’ decline is a primary reason that the rated U.S. banks have relatively limited direct exposures to the Detroit-3. Over a period of several years, banks exited or otherwise reduced their exposures. Those who are still exposed have significantly marked down their assets.

A number of U.S. banks, particularly those with lending concentrations in the industrial Midwest, also have exposure to primary suppliers of the domestic manufacturers. Nonetheless, many banks that remain exposed to the industry have been able to shift from unsecured credit facilities into secured exposures, where possible, and they have been provisioning for possible losses. Therefore, for rated U.S. banks, direct exposure to domestic auto manufacturers and suppliers is largely secured and not a major concentration risk. As a result, we do not consider auto manufacturer or supplier exposure to be a rating driver for any U.S. bank and the developing situation at both Chrysler and General Motors should not have material rating implications for the banks.

Although auto supplier exposures are a risk, the U.S. Treasury’s Automotive Supplier Support Program will likely enhance the viability of the supplier network by supporting payment of a bankrupt manufacturer’s receivables. That, in turn, will support the repayment of credit that the banks have extended to those suppliers. Other ripple affects from a possible bankruptcy will be felt, including those that impact small businesses and consumers in the local communities where manufacturing is concentrated. Local housing markets, already under pressure, will be further strained as unemployment remains elevated. Finally, future business volumes in those communities, potentially both deposits and loans, will suffer.

Despite these obvious challenges, the direct rating impact from any manufacturer bankruptcies will also be limited by the fact that the majority of rated U.S. banks tend to operate in multiple markets and have diversified portfolios. As an example, Comerica (rated B- for bank financial strength and A1 for deposits with a negative outlook) has disclosed a 46% drop in auto manufacturer/supplier outstandings since year-end 2005, to $1.5 billion at February 28, 2009. In addition, Comerica, which until recently was headquartered in Detroit, reported no direct exposure to Chrysler and less than $100 million in combined exposure to GM and Ford.

These balances compare with roughly $6 billion in tangible common equity (including hybrid equity credit). As a result, although Comerica is comparatively more exposed to the auto sector than many of its peers, its overall exposures have been reduced and are manageable within the context of its capital base. We believe that is the case throughout the rated banking universe.

Another potential concern is exposure to auto dealers, either through floor plan lending or through lending against a dealership’s real estate assets. Even if some or all of the auto manufacturers do not go bankrupt, the number of dealers is widely expected to decline significantly. However, the impact on most rated U.S. banks in this scenario is also limited.

This is so because the rated banks have, for the most part, focused on large dealer groups, which are those dealers with multiple locations and multiple franchises, both foreign and domestic. In contrast, smaller dealers that are exposed to only one domestic manufacturer are often financed by that manufacturer’s captive finance company or by a local community bank. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy of one or more domestic manufacturers could result in some credit losses from this business for the rated U.S. banks.

While there are no definitive conclusions to be drawn at this point, the bankrtupcy of Chrysler and, in short order, General Motors, will, just like the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, almost definitely comprise a core case study in business schools on the law of unintended consquences. Unlike the Lehman chapter 11, which was at the heart of the financial system and thus its impact was felt instantaneously, the D-3 fallout will be gradual, more pervasive, and as inhibitory measures take much longer to be enforced, likely have a much more adverse and far-reaching impact on both the U.S. and global economy.

The administration has started down a path from which there is no return, and while for the time being everyday cheerful TV appearances can mollify and suspend disbelief in what is happening due to the phenomenally orchestrated bull market now in its 10th week, the instant rationality returns (again, not if but when) to the market and cooler heads prevail, we will see the same market response as was witnessed in the days and months after September 15th, only this time, there will be no quick acronym-alphabet soup fix.


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Green Shoots Or Rose-Colored Glasses

May 10, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Just like yet another posthumous multi-platinum Tupac record, David Rosenberg resurfaces on Zero Hedge… Although, unlike Tupac, this is almost guaranteed the last incarnation of Rosie while a Merrill employee, doing what he does best – talking about employment trends and the consumer.

This is a boom compared to the post-Lehman collapse

Only the most ardent optimist would lay claim that the employment report today was a green shoot. Yes, yes, the -539,000 was broadly in line with ‘whispered’ estimates and certainly is less negative than the -707,000 average over the prior three months. If the benchmark for economic revival is the aftermath of the Lehman collapse when the credit market froze, suppliers went AWOL and consumers became comatose, then indeed, this looks like a virtual boom.

Nothing in today’s jobs report gives us that much comfort

But, in fact, all that has changed is the slope of the line when it comes to employment, output, spending or income. It is no longer pointing straight down in Wile E. Coyote fashion, but the fundamental trend is still down. Green shoot advocates miss the point. Recessions only end when the improvement in the second derivative morphs into something less fragile and more agile like improvement in the first derivative. Real cyclical bull markets only start once we are within 4-5 months of that improvement in the first derivative. Nothing in today’s jobs report gives us that much comfort.

January’s 741K decline was likely the worst we will see

At the risk of shooting the green shooters, let’s really assess the situation. Barring a catastrophe, it certainly looks as though the -741,000 print we saw in January was very likely the worst decline we will see in this recession. We won’t dispute that. But when you look at other cycles in the post-war era, what we see is that four months after the largest payroll decline, the losses are either negligible or we are actually swinging to positive job growth.

Employment has never been this weak before at this stage

So, the most appropriate way to examine the data is to see what the labor market looks like at this stage – four months after the biggest monthly collapse – and we have news for you: We are losing 539,000 jobs, or 0.4% of the workforce. In fact, employment has never been this weak before at this stage – a full four months after the worst figure. Not once. This post-credit collapse/asset-bubble burst cycle remains an enigma, and we strongly believe that investors today who are buying stocks and selling bonds in anticipation of a sustained reflation trade are going to end up as disappointed as they were under similar conditions in 2002.

Headline was actually worse than revised forecasts

As for the payroll report, the headline data was flattered by the addition of federal Census workers, which bolstered government payrolls by 72,000. The BLS birthdeath adjustment, when properly adjusted, also ‘skewed’ the number by nearly 60,000. So basically, adjusting for the Census workers and the Alice in Wonderland B-D adjustment, the headline payroll figure was really closer to -670,000. This means that the number was actually quite a bit worse than the post-ADP revised forecasts were calling for (shhh …don’t tell Mr. Market).

Widespread declines in private sector payrolls

Private sector payrolls actually sank 611,000 in April. The declines remain remarkably widespread with the diffusion index at 28%, which means we still have nearly four industries shedding their labor requirements for every industry that is bulking up on staffing (though admittedly a moderate improvement from the prior few months). Moreover, the data just do not square with the conventional wisdom permeating the investment landscape at the present time.
To wit:

You couldn’t tell we are in the midst of a commodity boom from this report, with employment in natural resources down 11,000.

And, we can see what an exciting 34.4 print on the ISM employment index brought manufacturing workers last month – 149,000 additional pink slips.

If the tech sector is back in revival mode, as we are told, then someone forgot to tell the HR departments at the firms that dominate this space because payrolls were cut 12,000. This was even worse than the 8,000 decline in March.

We keep hearing about how the real estate market is nearing some sort of bottom, and yet construction payrolls fell 110,000 and there were also 15,000 fewer real estate agents putting up ‘For Sale’ signs.

The leisure/hospitality stocks have been really hot of late. Here, we see that this industry laid-off 44,000 busboys, bell captains and bartenders last month in one of the worst numbers this sector has turned in during this down-cycle.

We would only have to assume that retailers were not fooled by the late timing of Easter in artificially underpinning their April sales results because they shed 47,000 workers on top of the 167,000 folks who were let go in the first three months of the year.

We keep hearing about how global exports and trade flows are now on a renewed uptrend, but again, there was no evidence of this in the payroll report considering that transportation services/warehousing employment tumbled 38,000. This was the very worst showing since right after 9-11. Green shoots for some economists, perhaps, but yellow weeds for any rational observer of what is really going on in the most crucial market of all for the economy – the labor market.

Even sectors that had been solid growth performers are now feeling the
spreading impact of this new world of frugality. Job gains of 15,000 apiece in education and health care are but a fraction of what were seeing before the credit collapse.

Amount of labor market slack is growing by the month

What is important about the employment data is that it provides us with so many clues as to what the inflation backdrop really looks like. So many market pundits draw their conclusions from the CRB index but there is no commodity that is any match for the labor market when it comes to determining the sustainability of any inflation pressure in the system. Even though the headline employment data are becoming “less negative”, if that is what turns you on, the reality is that the amount of slack in the labor market is growing by the month.

The unemployment rate jumped from 8.5% in March to a 26-year high of 8.9% last month – hard to believe it was sitting at 5% on the nose just this same time last year. Even here, the ‘official’ jobless rate grossly underestimates the degree of excess capacity in the labor market. The U-6 unemployment rate, which includes all forms of resource slack in the jobs sphere, edged up to a new lifetime high of 15.8% April from 15.6% in March.

Slack in labor market filtering into wages

This growing slack in the labor market is filtering through into wages. We see that average hourly earnings barely eked out any increase at all in April. This suggests that in real terms, personal income fell at least 0.1% during the month. That would make it four declines in a row for this critical 90% chunk of the economy. Not only that, but the steep slide in manufacturing payrolls – even with a pickup in overtime – spells for another 1.2% decline in industrial production for April. This, in turn, would take the capacity utilization rate – the ‘unemployment rate’ for industrialists – down to a record low 68.5% from 69.3% in March.

We maintain our constructive stance on Treasuries

As economists relying on data back to 1950, we have to admit that at no time have we ever seen the broad unemployment rate so high and the CAPU rate so low, and to think that any worker has any bargaining power or that any business has any pricing power given the massive amount of spare capacity in the labor and product markets is truly unfathomable. So it is against this deflationary backdrop that we maintain our constructive stance on safety and income and at a reasonable price, acknowledging that the Treasury market has moved aggressively against our view over the near-term. We are not swayed.

The duration of unemployment is surging

We can also see the strains from other pieces of the report. The male unemployment rate hit the 10% mark for the first time since June 1983. For both genders, the average length of time it is taking the ranks of the unemployed to find a new job has risen to 21.4 weeks from 20.1 weeks in March and 19.8 in both January and February – this is the highest level on record. The share of the unemployed who have been out of work for at least 15 weeks jumped 43.5% in March to 45.9% in April. The comparable figures for those who have been out of work at least a half-a-year jumped to 27.2% from 24.2% and up 5 percentage points since the turn of the year.

Job openings are practically non-existent

So, beneath the headline, what is so painfully obvious is how hard it is to find a new job – openings are practically non-existent. And what is truly grim is that the longer someone is out of work, the more discouraged they become, and over time, completely disengaged. For example, the number of permanent job losses has now approached almost six million for the first time on record and is up 176% over the past twelve months.

Most of these jobs lost will not be coming back

So, sadly enough, not only have we lost 5.6 million payrolls this cycle, shrinking the workforce by more than 4%, but the fact that there are so few opportunities as businesses adjust their production schedules to a new and permanently lower sales trendline, the data within the data reveal that most of these jobs are not going to come back anytime soon. While it is part of human nature to be hopeful, we can’t imagine that anyone can really put any sort of positive ‘spin’ on this report, but whoever does ostensibly didn’t get to Table A-8 on the complete unemployment picture.

We’re out of the hurricane, but it is still raining

There may be a growing sense that because the stock market has enjoyed a nice bounce, credit spreads have come in and new issue activity has perked up, that somehow things are going to get better in the real economy. Not so fast. We may be out of the hurricane, but it’s still raining outside. The economy bottomed in the summer of 1932 but the Depression did not end for another nine years and as a reminder, by the end of that decade, after seven years of grandiose New Deal stimulus, the unemployment rate was still at 15%, consumer prices were deflating at a 2% rate and we still had yet to reach the pre-Depression peak in GDP.

We must brace ourselves for a much more frugal future

Better does not mean good, and we must all brace ourselves for a much more frugal future. This does not mean the world falls apart. It means that lifestyles are going to change: frugality replaces frivolity, the family budget plan includes more savings for retirement and education, attitudes towards credit and discretionary spending shift, and owning the largest home on the block and the flashiest car is no longer going to be fashionable.

Focus on high-quality securities

For investors, this means focusing on high-quality securities – not the ‘junk’ that has led the way in this impressive but, in our view, still-vulnerable rally in risky assets. For those that missed the big nine-week move, don’t worry. Be patient. The story was right – the tortoise always wins the race.

Another 550,000 payroll plunge in May

As for the near-term employment outlook, some believe that the jobs data are about to look better because the markets have enjoyed a nice two-month rally. We will forecast the data on the tried, tested and true leading indicators on the ground. The still record-low workweek, at 33.2 hours, the 66,000 downward revisions to the back data (which tends to feed on itself) and the 63,000 slide in temp agency employment, coupled with the levels of both initial and continuing jobless claims, are foreshadowing a further 550,000 payroll plunge when the May data roll out in early June. That green shoot just turned into a dandelion!

Needles in the proverbial haystack

We don’t want to finish up on such a dour note. As with every report, there were some needles in the proverbial haystack. For example, the Household survey showed a 120,000 employment pickup but in reality, it was only a modest retracement from the 861,000 slide in March, not to mention the cumulative 2.5 million jobs lost in the first four months of the year. Even here, there is less than meets the eye, because three-quarters of the gain in the Household survey was people taking on a second job. Again, as we peel off the layers of this onion, we learn that whatever good news there may have been wasn’t so good. Best to stop there … and smell the weeds!


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Dresser-Rand Climbs on Low Volume (Zacks.com via Yahoo! Finance)

May 2, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Dresser-Rand Climbs on Low Volume

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Rand flat in 2Q (BizJournals)

May 1, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Buffalo business development company Rand Capital Corp. said its net asset value in the first quarter fell by 1-cent from the previous quarter to $3.53 per share.

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Rand Capital Corp. is looking for deals (The Buffalo News)

May 1, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

Rand Capital Corp. isn’t feeling the credit squeeze.

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Rand Gains, Firming Rank as Best of Emerging Markets in 2009 (Bloomberg)

April 30, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

April 30 (Bloomberg) — South Africa’s rand posted its steepest monthly gain since September 1986 as investors bet rate cuts may help the continent’s largest economy avoid the worst of the global recession.

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South Africa Trade Deficit Narrows to 512 Million Rand (Bloomberg)

April 30, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

April 30 (Bloomberg) — South Africa’s trade gap unexpectedly narrowed to 512 million rand ($60.5 million) in March as mineral exports increased. The deficit eased from 571 million rand in February, the South African Revenue Service said in an e-mail today.

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Rand Gains, Firming Rank as Best of Emerging Markets in 2009 (Bloomberg)

April 30, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

April 30 (Bloomberg) — South Africa’s rand gained, firming its rank as this year’s best-performing emerging-market currency, as the central bank cut its benchmark interest rate to the lowest in more than two years to revive the economy.

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Dollar plummets to new multi-month low versus South African rand (INO News)

April 29, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

(RTTNews) – The US currency extended European session’s downtrend against the South African rand during New York deals on Wednesday.

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(AFX UK Focus) 2009-04-29 17:42 SAfrica’s rand races to near 7-mnth high, stocks rise (Interactive Investor)

April 29, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

JOHANNESBURG, April 29 (Reuters) – South Africa’s rand firmed sharply on Wednesday and local stocks climbed after strong earnings reports in Europe lifted global stocks and boosted the appetite for risky assets. The JSE Top-40 index of blue chip stocks rose 1.04 percent to 18,367.50 points, while the broader All-share index gained 0.99 percent 20,481.77 points. “I think the market is taking …

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Rand races to near 7-month high, stocks rise (Independent Online)

April 29, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

South Africa’s rand firmed sharply and local stocks climbed after strong earnings reports in Europe lifted global stocks and boosted the appetite for risky assets.

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South African rand edges higher against US dollar (INO News)

April 29, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

(RTTNews) – The South African rand edged higher against the US dollar during early deals on Wednesday. At 3:45 am ET, the rand reached a high of 8.5935 versus the dollar, compared to 8.5800 hit late New York Tuesday. The next upside target level for the South African currency is seen around 8.2.

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Rand continues to rocket (News 24 South Africa)

April 29, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

The rand has shrugged off disappointing inflation numbers and continued its powerful rally against major currencies.

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South African Rand Gains Against Dollar on Rate-Cut Speculation (Bloomberg)

April 28, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

April 28 (Bloomberg) — South Africa’s rand rose to its highest level against the dollar since Oct. 3 on speculation the central bank will cut interest rates again this week to help spur consumer spending and boost economic growth.

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South African Rand Reverses Recent Losses Against Dollar (INO News)

April 28, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

(RTTNews) – The South African rand that fell to 8.9119 against the dollar at 3:10 am ET Tuesday strengthened thereafter.

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South African Rand Falls as Swine Flu May Deepen Recession (Bloomberg)

April 28, 2009 by admin · Leave a Comment 

April 28 (Bloomberg) — South Africa’s rand weakened for a second day on concern the spread of swine flu from Mexico may deepen a global recession, reducing demand for metals.

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